An agent-causal account which relies on indeterminism and probability, as advanced by Clarke, should not be considered accounts of free-will but as an advancement for multi-verse determinism. The account holds free-actions are caused by prior events while denying the sufficient and necessary case of determinism. To provide such a world, the case forwards an indeterminate world based on probability, thus allowing free-actions that are caused by prior events but the prior events do not necessitate a single outcome but a probable outcome in which the agent’s beliefs and desires lead to action. This account resolves the relationship between the agent, reason for the action, and the action which provides credibility to agent-causation but is incomplete as a whole picture.
It is my opinion that the indeterminate case of agent-causation put forth by Clarke and O’Conner are incomplete in the failure to recognize the potential of the other possible actions the agent may cause and that the possible outcomes are determinable through the concept of a multi-verse. The only way to apply Clarke’s account of agent-causation to the concept of multi-verse is through the theory of eternalism. Thus, through eternalism, probabilistic causation is determinable.
I. Eternalism
To understand how probabilistic causation is determinable one must take the first steps to understand eternalism. In the metaphysical debate over time two theories are contended, eternalism and presentism. The conventional model of presentism holds time in three states; past, present and future, and as time passes, the moment that was the present becomes the past, and the future becomes the current present. In this way time “moves” forward into the future and leaves the past behind, thus making everything present. This is also known as the A-theory of time, as based on The Unreality of Time, Taggart. Eternalism views time as a dimension of physics, similar to space, in that everything exists at once, future events are already here as well as past events, this is also known as “Block Time” theory. This theory takes the objective flow of time out of the picture. Taggart mentions the eternalism flow of time as B-series, in that we describe events not in a temporal form as past or future but in terms of before and after.
Eternalism gains its strength through the foreground of physics, the field of special relativity to be exact. By showing that simultaneity is not absolute but relative, it is impossible to say in an absolute sense whether two events happen at the same time if the events are separated in space. Another way to visualize this will be to look through frames of reference to time with a thought experiment. We have two individuals, one riding in the center of a bus and the other sitting on the side of the road, it is dark outside and the lights inside the bus are off. The man sitting in the bus turns on his flashlight at the same moment the bus passes the man sitting on the side of the road. To the person on the bus, the light from the flashlight reaches both ends at the exact time, while to the person sitting on the side of the road, the light reaches the back of the bus before it reaches the front. This difference in perception is based on the motion of the bus, but the aspect of time in this case is different, thus ensuring that simultaneity is relative and not absolute. In other words, special relativity makes no distinction between past future or present.
Eternalism turns time into a dimensional objectivity, and that it cannot be changed, all events along time are now so to speak and that we feel a flow of time because of the relativity we take to it. A clock therefore does not measure time but instead measures the temporal amount between events, much like a tape measure marks distance. Is eternalism compatible with probable causation? And if so, what does it say about agent causation?
II. Multi-verse Theory
Eternalism is compatible with probable causation, no matter how strange the concept seems. Eternalism as stated is acknowledging time as relative to the individual while also being a dimension of physics, thus it would be assumed that eternalism falls more in line with determinism, however another theory has been proposed to place eternalism with probable causation, multi-verse theory, or modal realism as put forth by Leibniz and Lewis. The main tenets of Modal Realism are:
1. Possible worlds exist
2. Possible worlds are the same sort as out own (differ in content not in kind)
3. Possible worlds are irreducible entities.
4. Actuality is indexical.
5. Possible worlds are unified by the spatiotemporal interrelations of their parts; every world is spatiotemporally isolated from every other world.
6. Possible worlds are causally isolated from one another.
The fourth tenet relates to the concept of my world being the real world, where as it is only the real world because it is the world that I live in. The fifth and sixth tenets separate possible worlds from having any effect on other possible worlds,, which I believe effective cuts us off from being able to discover if multi-verse theory exists or doesn’t exist. Lewis defends modal realism with a few reasons. The strongest being that we have no reason no to believe modal realism. Another is the creation of experiments analyzing the what if, and that studying the “what-if” scenario has become its own accepted structure, so a world of the what if is plausibly acceptable.
Modal realism relates to eternalism in that by applying possible worlds to a relationship between eternalism and probable causation we can build a set of worlds in which each probability happens and that eternalism holds true for each of these worlds. Thus each probable world has time as a dimension of physics without interfering with any of the other possible worlds, and each probable world ends up being a deterministic world.
III. The Loss of Agent-Causation
Clarke’s agent-causal account of free-will falters in light of eternalism and modal realism. Where the agent-causal account accepts that events are caused and that the agent makes choices based on probability, the account of modal realism takes all the possibilities the agent could make and creates a world for each action. If the premise of eternalism holds true in that time is a dimensional aspect of physics and is relative to the individual then it follows that there is no future or past or present, there is only the frame of reference to time thus all events are happening, the stone age is happening at the same time as Martians building empires on earth (possible future) it is only a frame of reference that measures the events, thus determinism holds true with eternalism. Since determinism holds true for each possible world in modal realism, it then concludes that agent-causation through an event probable world is still determined. All possible outcomes the agent could make have their own world and each of these worlds is a determined one through eternalism.
To finish, eternalism is the theory that time is a dimension of physics, proven through special relativity, using simultaneity thought experiments it can be shown that time is relative not absolute. An indeterminate world that follows probabilistic causation is compatible with eternalism in the effect of modal realism theory. If eternalism holds in each possible world of modal realism then determinism holds in each world of modal realism. If an agent-causal account of free will is based on indeterminism, it then follows that each possible world of the agents choice exists and that each of these worlds are determined, thus each of the agents possible choices still fall into deterministic settings through eternalism.
It is my opinion that the indeterminate case of agent-causation put forth by Clarke and O’Conner are incomplete in the failure to recognize the potential of the other possible actions the agent may cause and that the possible outcomes are determinable through the concept of a multi-verse. The only way to apply Clarke’s account of agent-causation to the concept of multi-verse is through the theory of eternalism. Thus, through eternalism, probabilistic causation is determinable.
I. Eternalism
To understand how probabilistic causation is determinable one must take the first steps to understand eternalism. In the metaphysical debate over time two theories are contended, eternalism and presentism. The conventional model of presentism holds time in three states; past, present and future, and as time passes, the moment that was the present becomes the past, and the future becomes the current present. In this way time “moves” forward into the future and leaves the past behind, thus making everything present. This is also known as the A-theory of time, as based on The Unreality of Time, Taggart. Eternalism views time as a dimension of physics, similar to space, in that everything exists at once, future events are already here as well as past events, this is also known as “Block Time” theory. This theory takes the objective flow of time out of the picture. Taggart mentions the eternalism flow of time as B-series, in that we describe events not in a temporal form as past or future but in terms of before and after.
Eternalism gains its strength through the foreground of physics, the field of special relativity to be exact. By showing that simultaneity is not absolute but relative, it is impossible to say in an absolute sense whether two events happen at the same time if the events are separated in space. Another way to visualize this will be to look through frames of reference to time with a thought experiment. We have two individuals, one riding in the center of a bus and the other sitting on the side of the road, it is dark outside and the lights inside the bus are off. The man sitting in the bus turns on his flashlight at the same moment the bus passes the man sitting on the side of the road. To the person on the bus, the light from the flashlight reaches both ends at the exact time, while to the person sitting on the side of the road, the light reaches the back of the bus before it reaches the front. This difference in perception is based on the motion of the bus, but the aspect of time in this case is different, thus ensuring that simultaneity is relative and not absolute. In other words, special relativity makes no distinction between past future or present.
Eternalism turns time into a dimensional objectivity, and that it cannot be changed, all events along time are now so to speak and that we feel a flow of time because of the relativity we take to it. A clock therefore does not measure time but instead measures the temporal amount between events, much like a tape measure marks distance. Is eternalism compatible with probable causation? And if so, what does it say about agent causation?
II. Multi-verse Theory
Eternalism is compatible with probable causation, no matter how strange the concept seems. Eternalism as stated is acknowledging time as relative to the individual while also being a dimension of physics, thus it would be assumed that eternalism falls more in line with determinism, however another theory has been proposed to place eternalism with probable causation, multi-verse theory, or modal realism as put forth by Leibniz and Lewis. The main tenets of Modal Realism are:
1. Possible worlds exist
2. Possible worlds are the same sort as out own (differ in content not in kind)
3. Possible worlds are irreducible entities.
4. Actuality is indexical.
5. Possible worlds are unified by the spatiotemporal interrelations of their parts; every world is spatiotemporally isolated from every other world.
6. Possible worlds are causally isolated from one another.
The fourth tenet relates to the concept of my world being the real world, where as it is only the real world because it is the world that I live in. The fifth and sixth tenets separate possible worlds from having any effect on other possible worlds,, which I believe effective cuts us off from being able to discover if multi-verse theory exists or doesn’t exist. Lewis defends modal realism with a few reasons. The strongest being that we have no reason no to believe modal realism. Another is the creation of experiments analyzing the what if, and that studying the “what-if” scenario has become its own accepted structure, so a world of the what if is plausibly acceptable.
Modal realism relates to eternalism in that by applying possible worlds to a relationship between eternalism and probable causation we can build a set of worlds in which each probability happens and that eternalism holds true for each of these worlds. Thus each probable world has time as a dimension of physics without interfering with any of the other possible worlds, and each probable world ends up being a deterministic world.
III. The Loss of Agent-Causation
Clarke’s agent-causal account of free-will falters in light of eternalism and modal realism. Where the agent-causal account accepts that events are caused and that the agent makes choices based on probability, the account of modal realism takes all the possibilities the agent could make and creates a world for each action. If the premise of eternalism holds true in that time is a dimensional aspect of physics and is relative to the individual then it follows that there is no future or past or present, there is only the frame of reference to time thus all events are happening, the stone age is happening at the same time as Martians building empires on earth (possible future) it is only a frame of reference that measures the events, thus determinism holds true with eternalism. Since determinism holds true for each possible world in modal realism, it then concludes that agent-causation through an event probable world is still determined. All possible outcomes the agent could make have their own world and each of these worlds is a determined one through eternalism.
To finish, eternalism is the theory that time is a dimension of physics, proven through special relativity, using simultaneity thought experiments it can be shown that time is relative not absolute. An indeterminate world that follows probabilistic causation is compatible with eternalism in the effect of modal realism theory. If eternalism holds in each possible world of modal realism then determinism holds in each world of modal realism. If an agent-causal account of free will is based on indeterminism, it then follows that each possible world of the agents choice exists and that each of these worlds are determined, thus each of the agents possible choices still fall into deterministic settings through eternalism.
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